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Man and His Rights
The experience of two world wars - and especially the memory of the system­
atic and centrally planned murder of millions of people in the second half of the 
twentieth century (which was marked by the emergence of a number of totalitar­
ian systems) - all encourage the modern man to pay particularly close attention 
to the old and new manners of justifying the measures and standards aimed at 
ensuring that similar events will be prevented in the future. In undertaking such 
considerations, some people still refer to the tradition of natural law, rooted in the 
thought of the pre-Christian times, but also important for the tradition that has 
been closer to Christians, who - to a great extent - built their theoretical approach 
to the essentials of order on the foundations of the Greco-Roman heritage. It is also 
a tradition that is important to the modern Western thought, including the liberal 
camp, since its creators - such as John Locke - were also its followers. This tradi­
tion corresponds, to some extent, to the approaches that look to find the sources 
of universally valid standards in the Revelation of God; it is also associated with 
approaches that make no reference to either the will of God, or to the concept of 
the nature of the species, but rather find the source of such standards in human 
faculty and reason. The reference to such varied approaches reveals a major issue: 
the normative order is sometimes - to some extent paradoxically - also associated 
with a set of standards recognized or established by a body of public authority ap­
pointed for that very purpose, which, while determining the content of the rules 
governing the behaviour of people living in a given territory, adds to those norms 
and standards an element of collective coercion, applicable to the individual vio­
lating such established rules. The question of whether such a body of authority is 
in itself related to some standards: derived from God, from nature, or reason, is 
still valid, despite the fact that among the proposed approaches appears one that 
seems to be particularly common today: perhaps, after all, the body that consti­
tutes the legal standards has not been established in order to align its will with 
some «higher standards», but rather with the boundaries set by justifiable rights of 
individuals (the so-called natural rights). Such rights may be due to them by virtue 
of their dignity, construed as possible behaviours of an individual and their right 
to demand certain behaviours of others under said standards. Human rights are 
usually derived from standards of a “higher law” - a fact that continually gives rise 
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to controversy. However, such an approach, close to many standpoints formulated 
in the second half of the twentieth century, is - to some extent - at odds with the 
older natural-legal tradition, according to which standards are not related to the 
rights of individuals (identified as prior in relation to the norms), but to the inher­
ent faculty of any member of mankind - so important to the “normative ethics” 
based on the idea of the reality of a universal set of human qualities determining 
the content of human nature or essence. This “older approach” leads us to the hy­
pothesis that natural human reason is capable of discerning the proclivities that 
guide an individual to their ultimate goal as a human being, and it also requires 
the reconciliation of the will of a legislative authority with known standards that 
protect such proclivities. 
The thesis that norms are already legal in character when individuals agree to 
abide by them “externally” (regardless of their subjective assessment), as a result 
of their fear of becoming the target of coercion on the part of the state, does not 
rule out the reconciliation of legal norms with the requirements based on con­
siderations concerning the proclivities of the species, but it also does not require 
such reconciliation. Problems related, on the one hand, with the relationship of legal 
norms and entitlements, and, on the other hand, with the strengthening of entitle­
ments - still cause much debate, as evidenced by the papers presented to the Read­
ers within this volume. These are texts that touch upon the issues of fairness of the 
established law and direct attention to human rights (those upheld and those vio­
lated) - which, in any case, are a major point of reference, and even have the power to 
bind the will of the governing bodies that create legal norms, thereby limiting their 
arbitrariness'. These texts are the fruits of a very interesting meeting held during the 
Third “Human Rights Education” Congress, which took place in December 2012 
in Europe (after the congresses in Australia and Africa), in Krakow, Poland (at the 
oldest Polish university) and in Auschwitz, Poland - where the most notorious Nazi 
German concentration and death camp was located during World War II. Auschwitz 
was a place of death, where millions of innocent people were deprived of their hu­
manity and murdered. 
As Dean of the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the Jagiellonian 
University in Krakow, the host and main organizer of the Congress, I would like to 
express my gratitude to Professor Sev Ozdowski from Sydney, who not only con­
tributed greatly to the excellent organization of the event, but also was always ready
1 Such self-imposed limitation leads to the paradox indicated as early as the seventeenth 
century by Thomas Hobbes: sovereign, unlimited legal authority (exercised by an individual as 
well as a group, or the current majority, or “the people”, or “a sovereign political nation”), is not 
only supposed to guard and ensure the enforcement of the law, but is also a source of instruc­
tion specifying the legal norms, backed by a threat of punishment, and, in fact, it the only body 
of authority capable of determining the limits and boundaries of its own actions - by means of 
law itself. Hobbes resolved the paradox by conferring full power to the sovereign and putting 
him above the law, which fact, however, did not necessarily entail his total arbitrariness - as 
the sovereign had to respect the freedom of individuals in the area where “the law was silent. ” 
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to provide the organizers with advice and assistance (also related to the subject mat­
ter). What is equally important, we could always count on his good humour. I would 
also like to take this opportunity to thank all the members of the team led by Doctor 
Krzysztof Mazur, whose skills and commitment I have always admired, and who 
is among those responsible for the success of the Congress. Finally, I would like to 
thank all the sponsors, without whose support it would be impossible for us to wit­
ness the immensely interesting addresses and establish close relations with repre­
sentatives of academic centres from all over the world. 
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